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Abstract. We introduce a generic construction principle for homomorphic en-
cryption schemes based on coding theory These possess several non-standard
positive features. First, they are not restricted to linear homomorphism but allow
for evaluating multivariate polynomials up to a fixed (but arbitrary) degree µ on
encrypted field elements. Second, they can be instantiated with various error cor-
recting codes, even for codes with poor correcting capabilities. Third, depending
on the deployed code, one can achieve very efficient schemes.
As a concrete example, we present an instantiation based on Reed-Muller codes
where for µ = 2 and µ = 3 and security levels between 80 and 128 bits, all
operations take less than a second (after some pre-computation). However, our
analysis reveals also limitations on this approach. For structural reasons, such
schemes cannot be public-key, allow for a limited number of fresh encryptions
only, and cannot be combined with the bootstrapping technique. We argue why
such schemes are nonetheless useful in certain application scenarios and discuss
possible directions on how to overcome these issues.
Keywords: Homomorphic Encryption, Coding Theory, Efficiency, Provable Se-
curity.
1 Introduction
Homomorphic encryption schemes are very useful cryptographic tools that en-
able secure computation. Informally, an encryption scheme Ek is homomor-
phic with respect to a set of functions F if for any f ∈ F one can compute
Ek(f(x1, . . . , xn)) fromEk(x1), . . . , Ek(xn)without knowing x1, . . . , xn. Even
ifF contains only functions based on one operation, e.g., linear operations, such
schemes have been used in various applications, such as electronic voting [15,
5, 19, 20], private information retrieval (PIR) [35], oblivious polynomial evalu-
ation (OPE) [39], or multiparty computation [18].
⋆ The work described in this paper has been supported by the Commission of the European
Communities through the ICT program under contract ICT-2007-216676 (ECRYPT-II). L.
Perret is also supported by the french ANR under the CAC project (ANR-09-JCJCJ-0064-01)
and the EXACTA project (ANR-09-BLAN-0371-01).
A variety of different approaches (and according hardness assumptions and
proofs of security) have been investigated in the last decades. The set of con-
sidered underlying problems include the Quadratic Residuosity Problem (e.g.
Goldwasser and Micali [29]), the Higher Residuosity Problem (e.g., Benaloh
[5]), the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (e.g., ElGamal [24], Gentry et al.
[28], Prabhakarany and Rosuleky [42]), and the Decisional Composite Residu-
osity Class Problem (e.g. Paillier [41], Damga˚rd and Jurik [22]). With respect
to homomorphic schemes that support more than one operation, a variety of
different assumptions have been considered as well: the Ideal Coset Problem
(e.g. Gentry [26]), the Approximate-GCD problem (e.g. van Dijk et al. [50]),
the Polynomial Coset Problem (Smart and Vercauteren [46]), the Approximate
Unique Shortest Vector Problem, the Subgroup Decision Problem, the Differ-
ential Knapsack Vector Problem (all of them have been considered in Aguilar
Melchor et al. [38]) To the best of our knowledge, no scheme exists so far whose
the security is based on the hardness of a problem from coding theory. Such
schemes would be interesting for at least the following two reasons.
1) Alternative Security Assumption.As the overview above indicates, most sche-
mes are based on assumptions from number theory. For the case that these turn
out to be wrong, e.g., due to quantum computers, it would be important to have
schemes at hand that are based on alternative assumptions. As summed up in [3],
in general promising candidates as alternatives to number theoretic problems
include: the problem of solving multivariate equations over a finite field, the
problem of finding a short vector in a lattice, and the problem of decoding a
linear code. While homomorphic encryption schemes have been built on the
first two problems. e.g., cf. [23, 38], none are known for the third.
2) Efficient Decryption Operation. In his seminal work [26], Gentry introduced
a new approach (and an instantiation based on ideal lattices) for constructing
fully-homomorphic encryption schemes, i.e., schemes that allow for evaluating
any function on encrypted data. One core idea is to bootstrap a scheme. The
key observation is that for getting a fully-homomorphic encryption scheme, it
is actually sufficient to design a scheme such that F contains the decryption
operation plus some additional operation. Gentry’s seminal paper [26] inspired
a series of new constructions [46, 50, 9, 8] that can be bootstrapped in principle.
However, all them are up to now rather proofs of concepts although some efforts
have been made to improve the efficiency of the schemes [47, 27].
Smart and Vercauteren [46] estimated that to evaluate a circuit of depth 2−3
the size of the public key ranges from 262, 144 bits (with a security level of 280)
to 741, 455 bits (with a security level of 2100). This is actually not sufficient to
achieve full-homomorphism. According to [46], this would require to evaluate
deeper circuits of level 7 or 8 and to consider lattices of dimension 227.
Van Dijk et al. [50] proposed a scheme that impresses with its conceptual
simplicity. To the best of our knowledge, no concrete instantiation has been dis-
cussed so far. The authors give for the basic scheme an estimation of the asymp-
totic size of the involved parameters: for example the ciphertext size is in O˜(s5)
and the complexity of the scheme in O˜(s10) where s denotes the security pa-
rameter. As this variant is not bootstrappable, the authors explain a variation of
the scheme that allows for bootstrapping, but at the price of a larger ciphertext.
Recently, Gentry and Halevi [27] have been able to implement all aspects of
the scheme [26], including the bootstrapping functionality. They also improved
[46] in the sense that the scheme only needs to consider lattices of dimension
215 to achieve full-homorphism. Interestingly enough, they proposed several
challenges 5 with different level of security. It is worth to mention that the cor-
responding public-key size ranges from 70MBytes for the smaller setting to 2.3
GBytes for the larger setting and the time effort for one bootstrapping operation
from 30s (small setting) to 30mins (large setting).
Currently, all known schemes share the same problem: due to the inherent
complexity of the corresponding decryption operation, large parameters need to
be chosen to enable the bootstrapping technique, leading to impractical schemes.
Therefore, one is highly interested into schemes with a decryption operation as
simple as possible. This makes code-based schemes particularly interesting as
for some codes decryption is simply a linear operation over the underlying field.
Indeed, Gentry states by himself, that he views ”a code-based construction as
an interesting possibility” [25, p. 11].
Contribution. In this paper, we make the following contribution:
Generic construction. We present a generic homomorphic encryption scheme
that supports the evaluation of polynomials up to a fixed but arbitrary degree µ
on encrypted field elements. The construction is based on coding theory, more
precisely on evaluation codes. This comprises a large set of known codes such
as Reed-Solomon codes, Reed-Muller codes, or Algebraic Geometric codes [31,
36]. Although we have to lay some additional conditions on these codes, we
expect that many different instantiations are possible. Furthermore, we do not
require the existence of efficient decoding algorithms (for the case that the error
locations are unknown). Hence, evaluation codes that are not useful for practical
error correction might be applicable for our construction.
Impossibility Results. The construction is based on the following (from our point
of view) natural design decisions:
1) Ciphertexts are erroneous codewords where the secret key allows to deter-
mine the error.
5 https://researcher.ibm.com/researcher/view_project.php?id=
1548.
2) As the set of codewords forms an additive group, we preserve this property
for directly achieving linear homomorphism.
We show that for structural reasons, these imply a set of limitations: (i) the
scheme can never be public-key, (ii) the number of encryptions needs to be
restricted, and (iii) the application of Gentry’s bootstrapping technique is not
possible, thus negatively answering the raised question. In Sec. 3.4, we argue
that such schemes can still be useful and discuss in Sec. 5 several strategies on
how to overcome these limitations.
Security analysis. We show that under the assumption that the attacker knows
the deployed code, the semantic security can be reduced to the known Deci-
sional Synchronized Codeword Problem (DSCP). The security reduction makes
use of the fact that the scheme is similar to a (generalized version) of a scheme
developed by Kiayias and Yung [33]. Considering DSCP allows for determin-
ing parameter choices for concrete instantiations. Moreover, it turns out that
all efficient attacks known so far on DSCP require the knowledge of the code.
Thus, by keeping the code secret (which is possible without losing the homo-
morphic properties) a security margin is present in our scheme that might allow
for even more efficient realizations. Indeed, the problem of recovering an un-
known code from erroneous codewords only, called Noisy Code Recognition
Problem (NCRP), has been investigated before and seems to be hard.
Efficiency and Concrete instantiation. As opposed to other constructions, our
scheme works over finite fields. More precisely, ciphertexts are vectors of length
n over some finite field and additive resp. multiplicative homomorphic opera-
tions are the component-wise sum resp. multiplication of vectors. The only con-
dition on the underlying field is that the field size is above some lower bound.
Hence, by choosing binary fields GF(2ℓ), the basic operations (addition and mul-
tiplication of field elements) can be efficiently realized. In general, the effort for
encryption is in O(n2) and the efforts for decryption, addition, and multiplica-
tion are all in O(n).
As an example, we describe an instantiation based on Reed-Muller codes
and determine both concrete values and formulas for the asymptotic complexity
under the assumption that the attacker knows the code, that is recovered part of
the secret key already. The asymptotic ciphertext length n is in O(µ3s) where
s is the security parameter and µ the degree of the polynomials that can be
evaluated. We present a concrete implementation where the size of the key and
ciphertexts range from 591 Byte and 9.81 KByte, resp., for µ = 2 and a security
level of 280 to 3.21 KByte and 60.95 KByte, resp., for µ = 3 and a security
level of 2128. In all test cases, all operations take less than a second (after some
pre-computation). Due to the additional security margin (gained by keeping the
code secret), more efficient parameter choices are expected to be possible (as
soon as the hardness of the NCRP is better understood).
Outline. We provide the necessary notation and preliminaries in Sec. 2. Then,
we present our generic encryption scheme in Sec. 3 and discuss some properties.
In Sec. 4 we explain the underlying decoding problem and reduce the semantic
security of our scheme to its hardness. In Sec. 5, we discuss a concrete instan-
tiation based on Reed-Muller codes and analyze its efficiency. Finally, Sec. 5
concludes the paper. Due to space limitations omitted proofs and an exact de-
scription of how the parameters are derived are presented in an extended version
[1].
2 Preliminaries
Notation. For an integer n ≥ 1, we denote by [n] the set of integers 1, . . . , n.
In the following, s will be a security parameter and F some arbitrary finite field.
Vectors v will be expressed in bold letters. We denote by F[x1, . . . , xt] the ring
of multivariate polynomials in the indeterminates x1, . . . , xt with coefficients
over F. For a polynomial p ∈ F[x1, . . . , xt] and a sequence of vectors V =
(v1, . . . ,vℓ) ∈
(
F
t
)ℓ
, we define p(V) := (p(v1), . . . , p(vℓ)) ∈ F
ℓ.
|v| denotes the Hamming weight of a vector v, that is the number of non-
zero entries, and supp(v) the indices of the non-zero entries. For two vectors
v and w, the expression v · w stands for the component wise product: if v =
(v1, . . . , vn) and w = (w1, . . . , wn), then v ·w = (v1 · w1, . . . , vn · wn).
A function f : N → R is called negligible if for any polynomial p(x) over
the real numbers there exists an integer n′ ∈ N such that |f(n)| < |1/p(n)| for
all n ≥ n′. We sometimes write f = negl(n). For two sets S and S′ equipped
of a binary operator ◦, we define S ◦ S′ := {s ◦ s′|s ∈ S, s′ ∈ S′}.
Linear Codes and Evaluation Codes. In this paper, we aim for constructing
homomorphic encryption schemes based on evaluation codes. Note that such
codes are a special sub-class of linear codes. First, we recall their definition:
Definition 1 (Linear Codes). A [n, k, d] linear code (with k < n) is a k-
dimensional linear subspace C of Fn with minimum Hamming distance d. That
is, w + w′ ∈ C and |w + w′| ≥ d for all w,w′ ∈ C. We call vectors w ∈ C
as error-free codewords and vectorsw ∈ Fn \ C as erroneous codewords. Erro-
neous codewords can be written as w + e where e ∈ Fn \ 0 is called the error
vector. The bad locations, that is where an error occurred, are supp(e) and the
good locations, i.e. error-free locations, are [n] \ supp(e). Let I ⊆ [n], we set:
C(I) := {w + e|w ∈ C, e ∈ Fn, supp(e) ⊆ [n] \ I}. (1)
In other words, C(I) is the set of all erroneous codewords where the positions
specified in I are good locations. In particular, we have C([n]) = C.
In addition, there exist two efficient (that is polynomial in the input length)
algorithms Encode : F→ C (encoding) and Decode : Fn × {I|I ⊆ [n]} → F
(decoding) such that Decode(Encode(m) + e, supp(e)) = m for all m ∈ F
and e ∈ Fn with |e| < d. This means that erroneous codewords can be decoded
efficiently possible if the bad locations are known.6
By choosing an encryption scheme where the ciphertexts are codewords from a
linear code and where the errors are at fixed, but secret locations I , yields di-
rectly a linear homomorphic encryption scheme. However, to get multiplicative
homomorphism as well, we need codes such that the product of two codewords
is a codeword again. For this reason, we focus on a special class of linear codes,
called evaluation codes.
Definition 2 (Evaluation Codes). Let X be a geometric object7 together with
a tuple x := (x1, . . . , xn) of n distinct points in X . Let F
X denote the set of
all mappings from X to F. We assume that we have a vector space (L,+) over
F, with L ⊆ FX , of dimension k. An evaluation code C is obtained by using
Encode = ex ◦ ev where
Expression: ex : F → L,m 7→ p is a mapping that expresses a message
m ∈ Fk
′
(with k′ ≤ k) as a function p ∈ L and
Evaluation: evx : L → F
n, p 7→ p(x) =
(
p(x1), . . . , p(xn)
)
is the evaluation
mapping that maps a function p ∈ L to its evaluation on x.
We call L(C) := L the function space of C and the vector x the codeword
support. For a codeword w = p(x), pw := p is the solution function of w.
Evaluation codes are useful for our goal as (under certain conditions) the product
of two codewords is a codeword again. Let the product of two functions p, p′ ∈
F
X be defined by (p · p′)(x) := p(x) · p′(x) ∈ F for all x ∈ X . Now assume
two codes C and Ĉ such that p1 · p2 ∈ L(Ĉ) for all p1, p2 ∈ L(C). Then, it holds
for any two codewords w1,w2 ∈ C:
w1︸︷︷︸
∈C
· w2︸︷︷︸
∈C
= pw1︸︷︷︸
∈L(C)
(x) · pw2︸︷︷︸
∈L(C)
(x) = (pw1 · pw2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈L(Ĉ)
(x) ∈ Ĉ. (2)
We generalize this concept in the following definition:
6 This is a natural prerequisite for any practical error correction codes. Moreover, as we do not
assume efficient decoding if the bad locations are unknown, some codes may be suitable for
our scheme although they are not interesting for error correction.
7 Typically,X will be the affine lineF (leading to Reed-Solomon codes), or a Cartesian product
of F (leading to Reed-Muller codes).
Definition 3 (µ-multiplicative Codes). An evaluation code C is µ-multiplicative
if there exists a code Ĉ with the same codeword support such that L(C)ℓ ⊆ L(Ĉ)
for all ℓ ∈ [µ]. We use the notation Cµ ⊆ Ĉ in this case.
Remark 1. The multiplicativity8 of codes as such has been studied extensively
in a series of papers, e.g. [12, 13, 43, 21, 44] but motivated by a different ap-
plication, i.e. secure multi-party computation. In particular, [21, 44] proposed a
new general framework to construct codes such that their powers are “good”
in some sense (asymptotic properties,reconstruction parameters,. . . ). At first
glance, such framework might allow to further enrich the types of codes that
could be used as a platform for our scheme. This question will be addressed in
an extended version of the paper.
We will later show that such codes exist in practice. Using µ-multiplicative
codes, we get a situation where the sum and the product of codewords yield a
codeword again. However, this does not automatically imply that decoding the
product of two codewords yields the product of the underlying messages. This
actually depends on how the expression mapping ”ex” in Def. 2 is realized. One
approach is to incorporate the evaluation of functions here as well. More pre-
cisely, we will use in the paper the following instantiation of evaluation codes
that we will call special evaluation codes:
Definition 4 (Special Evaluation Codes). A special evaluation code is an eval-
uation code as defined in Def. 2 where the expression mapping “ex” is realized
as follows. We fix an element y ∈ X , called the message support, whose role
is to encode a message into a codeword. We require that y is distinct from the
entries of the codeword support x. For any given message m ∈ F, we define a
subset of L as follows: Ly 7→m := {p ∈ L|p(y) = m}. We assume that there
exists for any m a function p ∈ L such that p(y) = m. That is, Ly 7→m is
non-empty. Given this, we consider an expression function ex that on input m
outputs a random p ∈ Ly 7→m.
From now on, we will consider special evaluation codes only. Observe that we
consider here only encoding of one field element although up to k elements
would be possible. The main reason is that it simplifies some security arguments
and ensures that there exist many different encodings for the samem ∈ Fwhich
provides probabilistic encoding (= encryption). This is a necessary prerequisite
for secure algebraic homomorphic encryption (see Boneh and Lipton [7]). We
leave the extension to larger plaintext spaces to future work.
8 We thank R. Cramer for pointing us this connection.
The next theorem shows that µ-multiplicative codes allow for additive and
multiplicative homomorphism regarding the encoding operation. The proof can
be found in [1].
Theorem 1 (Additive and Multiplicative Homomorphism). Let Cµ ⊆ Ĉ for
some special evaluation codes C and Ĉ. We consider a selection of at most µ
encodings wj ∈ C(Ij) of messagesmj ∈ F where Ij ⊆ [n] and set I :=
⋂
j Ij .
It holds
Closed under addition and multiplication:
∑ℓ
j=1wj ∈ Ĉ(I), and
∏ℓ
j=1wj ∈
Ĉ(I).
Additive homomorphism: Decode(
∑ℓ
j=1wj , I) =
∑ℓ
j=1mj , if |I| good
locations are sufficient for unique decoding.
Multiplicative homomorphism: Decode(
∏ℓ
j=1wj , I) =
∏ℓ
j=1mj , if |I| good
locations are sufficient for unique decoding.
3 The Encryption Scheme
3.1 Description
In this section, we formally describe the construction of our encryption scheme.
The scheme is symmetric and encrypts plaintexts m ∈ F to erroneous code-
words c ∈ C(I) where the key consists of I , the set of good locations, and the
used supports (which in fact determines the used code instantiations). Regard-
ing its homomorphic properties, it permits unlimited number of additions and a
fixed but arbitrary number of multiplications. The scheme is composed of five
algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, Decrypt, Add, Mult.
– (C, Ĉ, I) ← Setup(s, µ, L) : The input are three positive integers s, L, and µ
where s denotes the security parameter, L the expected total number of encryp-
tions9, and µ the maximum degree of the supported polynomials. The Setup
algorithm chooses a codeword support x, a message support y, and two special
evaluation codes C and Ĉ such that Cµ ⊆ Ĉ and the length of the codewords is
at least L. How to choose appropriate codes and parameters highly depends on
the considered coding scheme. We will describe in Sec. 5 a concrete instantia-
tion where this is possible. Setup also generates a set I ⊂ [n] of size T where
T depends on the parameter from above and the deployed code. I denotes the
good locations for the generated encryptions and represents the secret key of the
scheme. The output is the secret key k = (x,y, I).
– (c,1)← Encrypt(m,k) : The inputs are a plaintext message m ∈ F and a
secret key k = (x,y, I). Encrypt first chooses a random encodingw ∈ C ofm,
using the Encode algorithm and the knowledge of the supports x and y. Then,
9 This means an upper bound on the value on how many messages are going to be ”freshly”
encrypted. It does not include the number of possible combinations of existing ciphertexts.
it samples a uniformly random error vector e ∈ Fn such that supp(e) ⊆ [n] \ I
and computes c := w + e. Finally, the ciphertext is defined as the pair (c, 1)
where the first entry is an erroneous codeword in C(I) that encodes the plaintext
m while the second entry, the integer, is a counter to keep track of the number
of multiplications.
–m← Decrypt
(
(c, γ),k
)
: Decrypt gets as input the secret key k = (x,y, I)
and a pair (c, γ) with c ∈ C(I) and γ ≤ µ. It returnsm := Decode(c, I) where
Decode is used with respect to x and y.
– (c′′, γ′′)← Add
(
(c, γ), (c′, γ′)
)
: Add gets as input get as input two cipher-
texts (c, γ) and (c′, γ′) and generates an encryption of the sum of the plaintexts(
c+ c′,max(γ, γ′)
)
.
– (c′′, γ′′)← Mult((c, γ), (c′, γ′)) : This procedure get as input two ciphertexts
(c, γ) and (c′, γ′) with γ + γ′ ≤ µ and generates an encryption of the product
of the plaintexts (c · c′, γ + γ′) where “·” is the componentwise vector product
as explained in Section 2.
Correctness. The correctness for the case that neither Add nor Mult have been
used can be checked straightforwardly. Let (c, γ) and (c′, γ′) be two encryptions
ofm andm′, respectively, with c, c′ ∈ C(I). Then, by Theorem 1 it follows that
c + c′ ∈ C(I) and that Decode(c + c′, I) = m + m′. Analogously, we have
c · c′ ∈ C(I) and Decode(c · c′, I) = m ·m′ by Theorem 1 if c · c′ does not
result from more than µmultiplications. Observe that it is not necessary to know
the deployed codes, more precisely the supports x and y, for executing Add or
Mult. Only the knowledge of the underlying field is mandatory.
3.2 Alternative Description in Terms of Linear Algebra
Observe that the scheme actually represents a group homomorphic encryption
scheme between the additive groups F and Fn. This allows an alternative, pos-
sibly simpler description in terms of linear algebra (cf. Armknecht et al. [2] for
a comprehensive treatment). Let V0 ⊂ F
n denote the subspace that contains all
encryptions of 0, let c∗ ∈ Fn denote an arbitrary encryption of 1 ∈ F, and let
Verr ⊂ F
n denote the vector space of the error vectors. Then, encryption can
be equivalently expressed by: given a plaintext m ∈ F, sample v0 ∈ V0 and
ve ∈ Verr and output c := v0 +m · c
∗ + ve. Furthermore, there exists a vector
vkey ∈ F
n such that decryption can be performed as follows: given a ciphertext
c, computem = ct × vkey where × denotes the usual matrix-vector product.
3.3 Effort and Limitations.
Effort. One benefit of the proposed scheme is that encryption and decryption
processes are simple operations. Assume in the following that bases for V0 and
Verr are known and likewise the vector vkey. In some cases, these can be directly
written down. Alternatively, they can be computed by solving systems of linear
equation based on outputs from the scheme, giving an effort in O(n3) in the
worst case. Using this and the description from Sec. 3.2, one can easily validate
that the efforts for encryption and decryption are in O(n2) and O(n), respec-
tively. Furthermore, Add and Mult are simply the componentwise addition and
multiplication, respectively, of two vectors of length n. Thus, both operations
are in O(n) as well. Furthermore, the schemes work over any (finite) field as
long as the field size is not too small. In particular, this allows to use computer-
friendly fields GF(2ℓ) for a further speed-up.
Structural Limitations. The fact that the ciphertexts are in Fn yields several
limitations as we will elaborate now. For example an attacker who has n pairs of
plaintext/ciphertext at her disposal can compute the vector vkey from Sec. 3.2 on
her own by solving a system of linear equations. This imposes a natural upper
bound on the number of encryptions: not more than n − 1 known plaintexts
should be encrypted under the same key as otherwise security is lost.10 This also
shows that Gentry’s bootstrapping technique cannot be applied. As the key vkey
is composed of n field elements and as each ciphertext represents the encryption
of one field element, one would require at least n ciphertexts, thus exceeding the
bound explained above.
For similar reasons, no public-key variant can exist. Assume the opposite
and let V ′0 denote the set of all possible encryptions of 0 ∈ F (including linear
combinations). One checks easily that V ′0 forms a sub-vectorspace of F
n. Fur-
thermore, one can show (e.g., cf. [2]) that the scheme is IND-CPA secure if and
only if it is hard to decide for a given vector v ∈ Fn whether v ∈ V ′0 (also
called the subspace membership problem (SMP)). However, the latter is easy in
this case. Given sufficiently many samples from V ′0 , one can compute a basis
and then solve the SMP using basic linear algebra techniques.
Observe that all limitations are consequences of the fact that the underlying
algebraic structure is Fn. Thus, by switching over to another structure, e.g., a
ring, it might be possible to neutralize these.
3.4 Possible Applications
Before we analyze the security of the schemes, we argue why such schemes
are interesting for certain applications despite their limitations. Let us consider
some examples. In the Private Information Retrieval scenario a user wants to re-
trieve data from an untrusted (honest but curious) server without the server being
able to learn the data. If the stored data would be encrypted with an appropri-
ate homomorphic encryption scheme, applying polynomials on the encrypted
10 Here, we have to emphasize that this bound holds for “fresh” encryptions only. As the combi-
nation of existing ciphertexts does not provide any new information, there are no limits there
(except on the number of multiplications of course).
data could be used to filter out relevant data without revealing any useful infor-
mation about the plaintext to the server. Another example applies to Oblivious
Polynomial Evaluation where one party A holds a secret input x and another
party B a secret polynomial P . The goal is to allow A to obtain P (x) such that
no party learns anything about the secret of the other party (beyond what can
already be deduced from x and P (x)). Although solutions based on additively
homomorphic encryption schemes has been discussed for the case of univari-
ate polynomials, these become highly inefficient for the multivariate case. The
deployment of schemes that support both operations would help to enormously
reduce the effort.
Observe that both examples mentioned above have in common that it would
be sufficient if the deployed scheme is symmetric and supports only a limited
number of multiplications and a limited number of encryptions. Of course a
variety of other two party applications can be envisaged where deploying such
schemes is sufficient as long as there is a gain in efficiency. In other words, the
crucial factor here is not flexibility but efficiency.
4 Security Reduction to Coding Theory
In this section, we discuss the security of the proposed scheme. Recall that ac-
cording to the limitations due to the usage of Fn, it is necessary to use the
scheme as a symmetric-key encryption scheme and that the number of encryp-
tions is limited to some value below n. In this section, we show that under these
conditions, a security reduction to a known decoding problem is possible.
Decisional Synchronized Codewords Problem (DSCP). Recall that a cipher-
text is actually a codeword where the location of the good positions and the
deployed code instantiation (more precisely the used supports) form the secret
key. Especially the second property is rather unusual, making it difficult to es-
timate the security without long-term research. To assess this question to some
extent, we follow the usual approach by investigating a weaker variant of the
scheme.11 More precisely, we consider a variant where the used code is known
to the attacker, i.e., the attacker is given (eventually) a basis for the vector space
V0 while Verr remains secret. This allows for the following insights:
1. The security of the weaker scheme can be reduced to a known decoding
problem, called Decisional Synchronized Codewords Problem (DSCP).
2. We give an overview of the most efficient algorithms for solving DSCP so
far. It will turn out that all of them need to know the used code instantiation.
11 This is in line with other approaches where, for example, attacks on reduced-round versions
of a block cipher are presented and then to argue that adding more rounds give a hopefully
sufficient security margin.
Furthermore, as we will argue later, the problem of figuring out the code seems
to be hard according to the current state of knowledge. This indicates that keep-
ing the code secret provides an additional security margin. Whether this margin
is sufficient is subject to future research.
Similar to the the Kiayias-Yung-scheme [33], recovering the plaintext from
one ciphertext of the weaker scheme without knowing the secret key is equiva-
lent to decoding an erroneous codeword. But in contrast to [33], where the error
locations alter from encryption to encryption, in our scheme the positions of the
error free entries remain the same for all encryptions. This is a necessary prereq-
uisite for the homomorphic property. Therefore, recovering the plaintexts from
several ciphertexts (under the assumption that the code is known) is equiva-
lent to decoding several codewords where the errors are always at the same
locations. This is a special decoding problem which is known as the decod-
ing synchronized codes problem (DSCP). For a formal definition, note that the
problem of decoding codes is equivalent to identifying the good (resp. bad) lo-
cations: once a codeword is decoded, the good and bad locations can be easily
identified, and vice versa. We use this fact for defining the following problem
(see also [33]).
Definition 5. [Decisional Synchronized Codewords Problem (DSCP)] Let Cˇ
denote a [n, k, d] code. We consider a sampler S that on input (Cˇ;T, L) proceeds
as follows:
1. Choose uniformly random a subset I ⊂ [n] of size T
2. Sample L pairwise distinct codewords wˇ1, . . . , wˇL ∈ Cˇ.
3. Sample L pairwise distinct vectors eℓ ∈ F
n such that supp(eℓ) = [n] \ I .
4. Compute cℓ := wˇℓ + eℓ ∈ F
n.
5. Output Cˇ := (c1, . . . , cL) ∈ (F
n)L.
In addition, we consider two modifications of S , Sbad and Sgood. Sbad operates
analogously to S but chooses in addition i at random from the set [n] \ I , and
outputs (i; Cˇ). Sgood is defined similarly but i is selected at random from the set
I instead. We call an output (i; Cˇ) as DSCP instance.
The Decisional Synchronized Codewords Problem DSCP is to distinguish
between the two sampler Sbad and Sgood. For any probabilistic polynomial-time
(PPT) algorithm A we define AdvDSCP,A
Cˇ;T,L
:=
∣∣∣Pr[A(Sgood(Cˇ;T, L)) = 1]− Pr[A(Sbad(Cˇ;T, L)) = 1]
∣∣∣ (3)
where the probability is taken over the random coins from A and the samplers.
The DSCP[Cˇ;T, L] assumption holds with respect to a security parameter s if
AdvDSCP
Cˇ;T,L
(s) := maxAAdv
DSCP,A
Cˇ;T,L
is negligible in s.
Security Reduction. Next, we prove that the semantic security of the weaker
scheme can be reduced to the hardness of DSCP with appropriate parameters.
In a nutshell, semantic security requires that it should be infeasible for an adver-
sary to gain, for a given ciphertext, any partial information about the underlying
plaintext, even if the set of possible plaintexts is reduced to two different mes-
sages which have been chosen by the attacker before. This is formally captured
by a game where the adversary can request encryptions of adaptively chosen
plaintexts. Her task is to tell apart encryptions of two plaintexts that where cho-
sen by her. For a formal definition, we refer to [33].
For the proof of security, we make use of the following theorem on the
pseudorandomness of sampled instances:
Theorem 2. For any distinguisherA between the distributionsDCˇ;T,L (induced
by the sampler S from Definition 5) and the uniform distribution ULn on (F
n)L,
it holds that |Pr[A(Cˇ) = 1|Cˇ← DCˇ;T,L]− Pr[A(Cˇ) = 1|Cˇ← U
L
n ]|
≤
T · L · (n− T + 3)
|F|
+ T ·AdvDSCP
Cˇ−;T,L
+ 8T ·AdvDSCP
Cˇ;T,L
. (4)
where Cˇ− denotes the code obtained from Cˇ by removing one point from the
support x.
This theorem is an adaptation of Theorem 3.4 given in [33]. Despite of some
subtle differences due to the fact that we are dealing with a DSCP instance
here, the proof is very similar. For this reason and because of space limitation,
we omit the proof and refer to the full version of this paper and/or [33].
For the reduction, we need that an attacker is able to randomize codewords
in a controlled way. This can be done if the considered code allows for a special
encoding of 0 ∈ F as specified now:
Definition 6 (Special Encoding of 0). A special evaluation code Cˇ allows for
a special encoding of 0 if there exists a codeword wˇ = (wˇ1, . . . , wˇn) ∈ Cˇ such
that wˇi 6= 0 for all i ∈ [n] and Decode(wˇ) = 0.
We will show later a concrete instantiation, namely Reed-Muller codes, that
allows a special encoding of 0. Furthermore, it is easy to show that a special
encoding of 0 exists for Reed-Solomon codes. Given a special encoding of 0,
one can construct a transformation on vectors that will play a crucial role in the
reduction.
Proposition 1 (Transformation). Let Cˇ2 ⊆ C be such that Cˇ permits a special
encoding of 0, i.e., there exists a codeword wˇ = (wˇ1, . . . , wˇn) ∈ Cˇ such that
wˇi 6= 0 for all i ∈ [n] and Decode(wˇ) = 0. Then, there exists a probabilistic
mapping τ : Fn × Fk → Fn such that it holds for allm ∈ Fk:
1. For a uniformly random vector v ∈ Fn, the output τ(v,m) is uniformly
random in Fn as well.
2. For a codeword wˇ ∈ Cˇ(I), the output w := τ(wˇ,m) is a codeword in
C(I), that is the error-free locations of wˇ and w are the same. It holds that
pw(y) = m, that is w decodes to the second input m, and w is uniformly
distributed in the set of encodings ofm.
In other words, τ(.,m) transforms (erroneous) encodings under Cˇ of arbitrary
(possibly unknown) messages to (erroneous) encodings ofm under C and trans-
forms otherwise random vectors to random vectors.
The proof of this result is given in [1].
Theorem 3. The encryption scheme from Section 3 is semantically secure for
parameters (C, Ĉ;T, L) if the DSCP[Cˇ;T, L] and the DSCP[Cˇ−;T, L] assump-
tions hold for some code Cˇ with Cˇ2 ⊆ C that has a special encoding of 0 and if
T ·L·(n−T+3)
|F| = negl(s).
Proof. Let ASS be a PPT algorithm that breaks the semantic security for pa-
rameters (C, Ĉ;T, L) with at most L queries (including the challenge). We show
how to turn ASS directly into a distinguisher Adst which distinguishes between
the two distributions specified in Th. 2. If both assumptions DSCP[Cˇ;T, L] and
DSCP[Cˇ−;T, L] hold and if T ·L·(n−T+3)|F| = negl(s), then it follows from equa-
tion (4) in Theorem 2 that the advantage of Adst is negligible. Consequently,
this must be true for ASS as well which proves the semantic security.
Let Cˇ = (wˇ1, . . . , wˇL) ∈ (F
n)L be given toAdst which is either distributed
according to DCˇ;T,L or according to U
L
n . A
dst now simulates the encryption
oracle OSS for ASS as follows. As Cˇ has a special encoding of 0, we can use
the transformation τ defined in Prop. 1. For each encryption query mℓ from
ASS , Adst responds with cℓ := τ(wˇℓ,mℓ). When A
SS makes its challenge
(m˜0, m˜1) ∈ F
2, Adst uniformly random picks b ∈ {0, 1} and responds with
c˜ := τ(wˇℓ, m˜b) for some unused codeword wˇℓ.
If Cˇ is distributed according toULn , then each wˇℓ is uniformly random from
F
n and hence each response cℓ is some random vector in F
n as well by Propo-
sition 1. In particular, the response c˜ from Adst to the challenge of ASS is
independent of the challenge (m˜0, m˜1). Thus A
SS gains no information on the
value of b which shows that its advantage is zero in this case.
Now assume that Cˇ is distributed according to DCˇ;T,L. That is wˇℓ ∈ Cˇ(I)
for a common set I of good locations. By Proposition 1, each response cℓ is an
encoding ofmℓ in C(I). Furthermore, this procedure yields a uniformly random
encryption of a given plaintext (by Prop. 1). Therefore, ASS’s view is that it
received valid encryptions and any encryption for a chosen plaintext is possible.
Hence, it observes no difference to communicating with an encryption oracle
OSS. In particular, ASS has by assumption a non-negligible advantage to guess
b correctly.
The remainder of the proof follows the usual arguments.Adst runsASS suf-
ficiently often to estimate ASS’s advantage with sufficient precision. If the ad-
vantage is negligible,Adst assumes thatC was uniformly sampled from (Fn)L.
Otherwise, it assumes that C was sampled by DCˇ;T,L. ⊓⊔
On the Gap between the Known Code and Secret Code Cases. Obviously,
additionally knowing the code ease the attacks explained in Sec. 3.3. For ex-
ample, as the attacker can use her additional knowledge to compute a basis of
V0 and a choice for c
∗, getting about dim(Verr) ciphertexts would be sufficient
for deriving a basis of Verr. Even worse, the specific algebraic structure of the
deployed code can allow more refined attacks (see our analysis in [1] as an
example).
Interestingly, even in this weaker scenario, comparatively efficient schemes
can be possible as we will demonstrate in the next section. Furthermore, it seems
to be hard problem to figure out the used codes from the observed erroneous
codewords, that is to transform the secret code case into the known code case.
This problem is known as the noisy code recognition problem: the attacker sees
noisy codewords of an unknown code, and tries first to find the code, and also
to decode. The noisy code recognition problem has been studied in [48, 49, 14],
and the associated decision problem recognized to be NP-complete. The general
principle for dealing with such a problem is to gather noisy codewords and try
finding codewords in the dual code using linear algebra. Of course, due to errors,
these words will rather tend to be wrong. However, the lower the weight of
words in the dual, the more probably it is for them to be correct words of the
dual code of the code.
Due to the limited allowed number of encryptions in the presented scheme,
an attacker would not able to collect many codewords, which in particular pre-
vents the low weight dual codewords attack. Furthermore, we discuss [1] con-
crete instantiation how parameters can be chosen such that the expected number
of low weight codewords in the dual codeword is negligible.
5 A Concrete Instantiation based on Reed-Muller Codes
In this part, we present a concrete instantiation of our scheme based on punc-
tured Reed-Muller (RM) codes. RM codes are based on evaluating multivariate
polynomials on certain points. Adopting the notation from Def. 2, the geometric
object X is a vector space Ft over a finite field F of size q. The vector space
Lt,ρ of functions is obtained by taking multivariate polynomials in F[v1, . . . , vt]
of total degree strictly less than ρ with coefficients over F: Lt,ρ := {f ∈
F[v1, . . . , vt] | deg(f) < ρ}. The code support x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a vec-
tor of n distinct elements of Ft. The q-ary RM code of order ρ < q, denoted by
RMq(t, ρ), is defined by RMq(t, ρ) :=
{(
f(x1), . . . , f(xn)
)
∈ Fn | f ∈ Lt,ρ}
where q denotes the size of the deployed field. The usual full RM code is ob-
tained when the code support x = (x1, . . . , xqt) contains all elements of F
t.
For the sake of efficiency and security, we consider punctured RM codes where
n < qt (i.e. some positions are removed). In the sequel, punctured codes are
denoted by RMq(t, ρ)
⋆.
In what follows, we consider only RM codes that are special evaluation
codes, that is where the encoding is realized as specified in Def. 4. Furthermore,
we have
Corollary 1. Let 1 ≤ µ ≤ q be arbitrary. Then there exist RM codes Cˇ, C, Ĉ
such that (i) Cµ ⊆ Ĉ and (ii) Cˇ2 ⊆ C and Cˇ allows for a special encoding of 0.
Thus, RM codes can be used to instantiate our scheme (proof is given in [1]).
In [1], we present a possible approach for instantiating RM codes such that
the scheme works correctly and the DSCP seems to be hard. Shortly summed
up, the length n is in O(µ3 · s) and the field size (in bits) log2 q is in O(s
2/3).
This yields a ciphertext length in bits in O(µ3 · s5/3). Furthermore, it holds
that
T ·L·(n−T+3)
|F| ≤ s
3/2s
2/3
= negl(s). Thus, the upper bound given in Th. 2
is negligible in s which in turn guarantees the semantic security according to
Th. 3.
Of course, for practical instantiations concrete values are more meaningful.
In Table 1, we list the values nmin and log2 qmin (referring to the smallest possi-
ble choices of n and q) for different selections of s and µ. With these parameters,
both the identified attacks on DSCP (see [1]) and the approaches for recovering
the code become infeasible. Observe that the choice of these values concerned
only the DSCP but not the (non-tight) upper bound in eq. (4). If one wants to
choose parameters such that T · L · (n − T + 3)/|F| ≤ 2−s, then bigger fields
need to be chosen. This yields an increase of the ciphertext length by a factor
between 6 and 10 (depending on s). We implemented our scheme in the algebra
system Magma V2.11-1 and did let it repeatedly run for several parameters (on
a W500 Thinkpad laptop with 4GB RAM). The results can be found in Table
2. There, ”setup” includes the precomputations mentioned in Sec. 3.3. As the
estimated effort for the precomputation is in O(n3) = O(µ9 · s3) it is not sur-
prising that it takes by far the most time. However, our tests indicated that the
bottleneck is actually the memory consumption. Observe that the major step of
Security Parameter s = 80 s = 128 s = 256 s = 80 s = 128 s = 256
µ µ = 2 µ = 3
nmin 4,725 8,411 19,186 14,236 26,280 61,044
log2(qmin) 17 18 23 18 19 24
Ciphertext length 9.81 KByte 18.48 KByte 53.87 KByte 31.34 KByte 60.95 KByte 178.84 KByte
Key size (= nmin bits) 591 Byte 1.02 KByte 2.34 KByte 1.74 KByte 3.21KByte 7.45 KByte
µ µ = 5 µ = 10
nmin 60,176 114,189 269,327 448,017 862,336 2,076,969
log2(qmin) 20 20 25 22 24 27
Ciphertext length 146.91 KByte 278.78 KByte 821.92 KByte 1.17 MByte 2.47 MByte 6.68 MByte
Key size (= nmin bits) 7.35 KByte 13.94 KByte 32.88 KByte 54.69KByte 105.27 KByte 253.54 KByte
µ µ = 100
nmin 419,217,826 817,560,769 2,008,578,063
log2(qmin) 29 31 33
Ciphertext length 1.42 GByte 2.95 GByte 7.72 GByte
Key size (= nmin bits) 49.97MByte 97.46 MByte 239.44 MByte
Table 1. Computation of the minimum length nmin of the ciphertexts and the minimum field size
log2 qmin in respect to the security parameter s and the number of multiplications..
the precomputation is to find the linear mapping
λI : F
|I| → F, (p(xi))i∈I 7→ p(y) (5)
which can be done by computing the kernel of a given matrix (where the rows
are evaluations of linearly independent polynomials pi on the good points). As
this matrix possesses a special structure, there might be still room for improve-
ment. Independent of this, the precomputation can be parallelized to some extent
(compute the kernels of different submatrices in parallel and intersect them at
the end). Furthermore, some kind of ”global” precomputation is possible. More
Parameters Effort Setup Effort Encryption Effort Decryption Effort Addition Effort Multiplication
µ = 2 Min: 1m 57.781 s Min: 0.031s Min:< 10−28s Min:< 10−28s Min:< 10−28s
s = 80 Max: 1m 58.998s Max: 0.11s Max: 0.032s Max: 0.016s Max: 0.032s
Av: 1m 58.33s Av: 0.072s Av: 0.001 Av: 0.000573s Av: 0.005238s
µ = 2 Min: 1h 18m 22.089 s Min: 0.686s Min:< 10−28s Min:< 10−28s Min:< 10−28s
s = 128 Max: 1h 20m 21.024s Max: 1.014s Max: 0.016s Max: 0.031s Max: 0.032s
Av: 1h 19m 12.149s Av: 0.817s Av: 0.004s Av: 0.0017s Av: 0.01044s
µ = 3 Min: 46m 3.089 s Min: 0.171s Min:< 10−28s Min:< 10−28s Min:< 10−28s
s = 80 Max: 47m 4.024s Max: 0.312s Max: 0.016s Max: 0.016s Max: 0.047s
Av: 46m 40.149s Av: 0.234s Av: 0.002s Av: 0.0015s Av: 0.014s
Table 2. Run time of the proposed encryption scheme for different parameters. The entries rep-
resent the minimum (Min) time, the maximum (Max) time, and the average (Av) time in the
experiments.
precisely, given the mappings λIj for sufficient many linearly independent vec-
tors Ij ∈ F
T , one can compute any other mapping λI from them. In other words,
the results from precomputations done for one key can be used to accelerate the
precomputations for another key.
On the good side, it turns out that once the precomputation is accomplished,
all other operations (e.g., encryption, decryption, etc.) are comparatively effi-
cient (1 second or less for the considered test cases). Given the novelty of this
approach and the fact that the implementation is by no means optimized, we
consider these results as quite promising. Especially in comparison with other
schemes that provide additive and multiplicative homomorphism (e.g., see the
overview in Sec. 1), our scheme is highly efficient.12
Discussion and Conclusions. We gave the first encryption scheme based on
coding theory that is homomorphic wrt. two operations: addition and multipli-
cation. For structural reasons, the scheme has to be secret-key and the number
of encryptions needs to be limited. Nonetheless, applications exist where such
schemes can be useful. This is in particular true as we could describe concrete
instantiations that are comparatively highly efficient.
The most important question is probably whether other code-based con-
structions exist without the identified limitations. One approach could be to
look for more involved constructions where linear codes are not directly rep-
resented. However, caution must be paid to not lose the advantages with respect
to efficiency, e.g., the linear decryption algorithm. Another approach could be
to replace the field F by a weaker algebraic structure, e.g., a ring. This certainly
avoids the straightforward application of methods from linear algebra. How-
ever, one has to pay attention that the decoding procedure, e.g., interpolation of
polynomials, is still possible.
Another question is the investigation of the secret code case. Keeping the
code secret should add a further security margin, but how much and what is the
impact on the parameter sizes? But even for the known code scenario, interest-
ing problems remain. Although we picked Reed-Muller codes for our concrete
instantiations, other codes might yield even better results. As also codes with a
low correction capacity might be used, the code might be chosen from a wide
set of possible codes. Another possible extension is to remove the condition of
fixed error locations. This may allow a reduction to a hard decoding problem.
Of course, this likewise means that the noise can grow but similar holds for all
presented bootstrappable schemes as well.
Another research direction is whether the schemes can be made KDM (key
dependent message) secure. Informally, KDM security means that a scheme re-
mains secure even if an encryption of the deployed key is given, that is Ek(k),
and is crucial for Gentry’s bootstrapping technique. However, the KDM secu-
rity of the proposed bootstrappable schemes is an open question and needs fur-
12 Of course, other schemes may provide a higher flexibility, e.g., being public-key. We focus
here only on the case that a symmetric scheme with bounded multiplicative homomorphism
and a bounded number of encryptions are sufficient, e.g., the applications discussed in Sec. 3.4.
ther investigation. Interestingly, the proposed scheme (in its ”linear-algebra”-
description from Sec. 3.2) has some striking similarities with a scheme by Boneh
et al. [10]. The latter has been one of the first schemes for which KDM security
could be proven using standard assumptions. Indeed, similar arguments may be
used here but the underlying problem, the rank problem, is easy in Fn. This
immediately raises the question whether variants of the scheme may exist for
which KDM security can be shown.
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